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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Macario Arellano,
LS

an illiterate Mexican laborer,

employed by the Western Pacific Railroad Company

: its section at Dumphy,

Nevada, which is some 23

lles east of Battle Mountain, Nevada.

(T-12)

o

The

1ly language which he can speak or understand is
>anish, but he can neither read nor write his native
>ngue.

He cannot speak,

L-103),

(T-115),

read or write

o

(

T- 1 0 )

a

>lyglot mixture.
~rez

(T-9

although he does understand certain;

>rds as used with relation.ship
~ o ym en t

English~

to his railroad em-

The section crew at Dumphy was a
It consisted of two Mexicans,

and Macario Arellano,

Pete

and a Pue,rto Rican named

:ancisco Matta, none of whom spoke any language
lt

Spanish.

(T-13).

·ew were Indians,

The other two members of the

Jerry Jackson, who spoke primarily

toshone dialect and possessed a smattering of
towledge of English, Baul Thompson, who spoke
toshone and English (T-13),

and the Foreman, Enrico

;yva, a Spanish-American who spoke the English
.nguage.

(T-13).

The Roadmaster in charge of the

ction, whose headquarters were in Elko, Nevada, was

vid Charlevois, who spoke English but had no
owledge ofSponsored
either
Shoshone or Spanisho (T-13,
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

T-13/

On the 31st. of

M~rch,.

1954, Macario Arellano,

gether with the other members of the section crew,
e foreman

and the roadmaster, went to a culvert

proximately one mile east of the Dumphy section
:adquarters to dump a load of rock into the culverto

'-16).

The rock was to be used as reinforcement

prevent a p o s s i b 1 e wa s h o u t

I

o

Upon reaching the

.lvert, the roadmaster, Char1evois,
d~ing

, be dumped and in so
'-18).

the car was derailed.

The foreman and Perez were detached from

.e group
1

caused the car

to obtain equipment to replace the car

the rails,

(T-19),

and Charlevois with the four

:maining members of the crew undertook to remove

.e rock from the right of way in order that
affic might be resumed.

(T-19, T-139).

At that time the rocks were piled approximately

.ree feet deep at or along the south rail.
21, T-122)o
ade of the

(T-20,

The pile extended southerly down the
track bed,

some of the rocks having

11en into the culvert itse1fo

The crew members

mmenced to roll the rocks from the top of the

1e down the grade, using bars when it was deemed
cessaryo

(T-21).

Charlevois,

the roadmaster,

assumed active
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management and control of the work,

(T-139),

notwithstanding the fact that two of the four
men remaining understood no English, and he understood no Spanish and the other members were ShoshonE
Indians, only one of whom spoke English and neither
spoke Spanish, while Charlevois possessed no knowlec
of the Shoshone dialect.

Exhibits 1,

2, 3, and 4

provide a general picture of the area in questiono

The exhibits show the elevated position of the
tracks and provide in addition information as to
the nature and extent of the slope that existed

from the track to

~he

edge of the cluvert, as well

as the area immediately south of the culverto
Some~orientation

of the pictures is necessaryo

All views of the culvert set forth in exhibits 1,
2, 3, and 4 show the south side of the culvert and
the area where

the rocks lay.

Exhibit 1 is a

>icture of the culvert facing west and exhibit 4
ls a picture of the culvert facing easto
~ and 3 are pictures which

Exhibits

show substantially the

;ame area and are pictures taken so that the top of
:he picture would be north,

the bottom south,

the

.eft hand west t:oward Battle Mountain, and the right
.and east Sponsored
toward
Beowaneu
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Macario Arellano,

the appellant,

testified that

the time of the accident he was standing on the
st side of the pile along the top of the pile in

area which he has marked with what would appear
be an "x'', rolling stones,

-21, T-22, T-113)

o

He

(figure 1, exhibit 3),

~estified

that he worked in

at general area for approximately 20 minutes and
at at the conclusion of said period the roadrnaster,

arlevois, directed him to remove a rock on the
ttom of the pile which was serving as a dam
eventing the rocks from rolling down the hill.
at the roadmaster pointed to a particular rock
d said "roll that rock" .
lked around the east
re no rocks down

le, (figure 2,

(T-110).

That he

side of the pile where there

to the bottom corner of the

exhibit 3), to a spot free from

:k, and attempted to dislodge the rock the
ldmas ter had designated
lt

0

(Figure 3, exhibit 3)

o

he could not move that particular rock but

:able to dislodge one immediately adjacent, and
he did and turned to throw the rock over the
.e , a s s [. own in the ex h i b i t s , the p i 1 e s h i f t e d
commenced to roll down the grade.

A rock struck

in the middle
ofLaw Library.
the
and
knocked
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Fundingback
for digitization provided
by the Institute
of Museum and Libraryhim
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rer the piling into the immediate vicinity of the
.ack marked areS: (figure_ 4, exhibit 3)

o

The

pellant testified that tJle other three members

:the crew were on the west side of the pile (T-23),
.d that they were rolling

stones in the same manner

: had been rolling stones from the top of the pile
d in a position of safety and that Charlevois was
tween him and the other members of the crew and
a distance of from 12 to 20

Charlevois

1

feet from Arellanoo

version was entirely differento

ated, contrary to Arellano,

that he, Charlevois,

s on the east end of the pile and that Arellano
son the west end of the pile.

( T -13 9 ,

T- 14 0 ) •

only has a recollection of the whereabouts of
e appellant..

He further testified that Arellano

s unsteady on his feet and he ordered him by

lling to get away, and that immediately thereter, Arellano started down the west or left side

the pile and across the bottom of the pile,
Lch time he
~o

at

fell from the top of the culvert

the rocks below in substantially the same

!a where Are llano says he fe 11 o

(

T-140, T-148).

The whereabouts of Matta was unknown at the
1e of trial,

although he was allegedly somewhere

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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He

Of the two remaining witnesses,

Puerto Ricoo

ckson was called by the plaintiffo

Thompson,

e fourth witness, who was at the time of trial
ill in the employ of the Western Pacific Railroad

mpany, and in Salt Lake City, was not called as
witness by the defendanto

Jackson, one of the Indians, had not seen
ellano from the date of his injury until he saw him
court, and could not have conversed with him
d he seen him,

ltieso

by reason of linguistic diffi-

He completely repudiated Charlevois and

>ported Arellano's testimony in general
~d

a

He testi-

that Arellano was on the east side of the pile
rocks~

lling

which is where Arellano testified

was but which conflicted with Charlevois'
~siono

tbers

{T-124)o

He stated that the other three

of the crew, and Charlevois, were at the

end of the pile, which is where the appellant

:t

tified they wereo

(T=l24)

8

He stated that

hough Charlevois was standing near him, he did
hear Charlevois yell to Arellano or anyone
e.

That he heard no commotion or statements

il he heard someone yell, "The old man_ fell''o
6
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That he looked up and saw Arellano

.126)o

lng in almost the exact spot Arellano testified he

f3lleno
wo~ked

(T-125, T-126).

He stated further he

with Arellano all that day;

appear to be wobbly on his feet,

or ill, which

contrary to the Charlevois versiono
!te

that he did

(T-173).

is no disagreement that Arellano was injured,

l seriously injured,

although there was a con-

.ct as to the extent of the injury.
~duced

Appellant

testimony that he was permanently in-

acitated for work, and again,

the only independent

ness, Miya, verified the position of the appellant'
·sician, namely that Arellano was not capable
doing manual work because of the condition of his
h t arm.

There was no conflict in the

( T- 3 2) .

timony either that the defendant railroad
reafter secured Arellano•s resignation by a
ck and a fraud,

leading him to believe he was

ning a chit for groceries when in fact he was
ning a resignation.

(T-27, T-28), nor is there

conflict with the fact that when Arellano was
ised that he had,

in fact,

signed a resignation,

iesired to revoke the same but that the respondent
Lroad would
not permit him to go back to worko
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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It is not denied and therefore must be held
be admitted that:

One of the jurors selected to

y the above act ion was a man named Fe 1 ton Jones,

was and is a brother of a Salt Lake City attorney

0

med Shirley Jones,

Jro

During the noon

(SuboTr.-5).

cess of the second day of trial and on Wednesday,

vember 9, 1955, Shirley Jones Jr. approached Mr.
wis, one of the defense counsel,

in the City and

unty Building and asked him if the jury was outo

answer to the statement by Lewis that the case
s going slowly,
Jut

it,

~re."

Jones stated:

''Yes,

I got a brother that is a

That he further

I

know all

juror in

stated, "It's funny that

brother gets picked for all these railroad

;es,"
lt

and requested a conference with Lewis.

they thereafter conversed quietly for a

short

:iod of time in tones which the witness could

:hear, although he did hear "That old Mexican."
lb.Tr-5).

That the witness subsequently saw

.rley Jones,
ognized him,
Vous.

Jr.

at his office.

That Jones

stared at him and acted pretty

(SuboTr-6 -

7).

Mr.

Lewis,

one of defense

nsel, ~dmitted seeing Jones during the trial.

8
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)ub. Tro-8) and did not deny the conversation above
~t

fortho

(Sub.Tr-8)a

The verdict was a 6-2 verdict in favor of the
~fendant,

and one of the subscribing jurors to

verdict, and an essential part of that

lat

This same Jones had

rdictj was Felton Jones.

vised another member of the jury that he had a
lative who was an attorney and he knew a little
t

about the law .

This is also the same Jones

o entered the jury room and assumed the initiative

the discussion therein, advised everyone he did
:believe the respondent's version,

that Charlevois'
\

>ry was "hogwash'' but
~re

that it was his opinion

was no negligence on either side and that the

·diet should be "no cause for action"

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1.

That the court erred in giving its instructio

her 12o
2.

That the court erred in refusing to give

lntiff's proposed instruction number 3o
3.

That the court erred in refusing to give

~ntiff's

4.

proposed instruction number 2o

That the court erred in refusing to give
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

1aintiff' s proposed instructions 1 and 5o

1

5.

That the court erred in refusing to give

laintiff's proposed instruction number 6.
6.

That the court erred in refusing to give

laintiff's proposed instructions 13 and l4o

7.

That the court erred in refusing to grant

ppellant a new trial by reason of the misconduct of
juroro

Io

THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION 12

The almost unanimous weight of authority
1roughout the country is to the effect that a
Lrty is

entitled to have the court instruct the

iry on any theory or

theories which he may have

d which are supported by evidence

ring the t t ia 1.

introduced

That Utah follows the majority

le in this country is established in Startin

Vo

dsen, 237 P(2) 834, wherein the court stated:

"The instructions should not be susceptible of
misconstruction as either comments on the
evidence or arguments for either side of the
caseo
It was the duty of the court to cover
the theories of both parties in his instructions o"
When a court refuses to instruct upon a theory
a party to the trial appeals from such refusal,
evidence in support of the theory should be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

aken 1n its strongest light in favor of such
equestv

Young

Vo

Carlson, 276 P(2) 23o Plaintiff

equested an instruction on last clear chance which
refused by the trial courto

IS
1

Plaintiff appealed

the sole ground that it was prejudicial error

>r the trial court to have refused to grant his
~questo

The Court of Appeals,

lis question,

in considering

stated~

"It is of course the duty of the court to
instruct on every theory of the case finding
support in the evidenceo
Daniels Vo San
Francisco, 40 Cal. (2) 614, 255 P(2) 785;
See also Simmer Vo San Francisco, 116 Cal.
App. (2) 724; Doran Vo San Francisco, 127
CaloApp.(2), 274 P(2) 464.
Therefore the
basic question is whether, interpreting
the evidence most strongly in favor of the
appellant, there is any reasonable basis for
the application of the last clear chance
doctrine.
Bolton v. Martin, 126 Cal.Appo(2)
178, 271 P(2) 99lofl
Ten of .the appellant's proposed instructions
.ated to his theory of the case based upon the
ts at bar, it being appellant's theory:

(1)

t the respondent had the duty to provide a safe

nor method for doing the work required;
that when more than one alternative method was
loye d, one of which is dangerous,

..

"''~-,_

is safe,

the other of

that it is negligence of the

,onden t not to employ the safer way;

(3)
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

that the respondent had the duty not to expose the
appellant to any unnecessary risk;

(4)

that

the

lopellant did not assume the risk of his employment
Lnd he was not negligent

if he worked in a place

,f danger pursuant to order;
'as -required to

(5)

that the respondent

take into consideration the servant':

ignorance and ability to comprehend in issuing

ge~

rders and that orders must be issued in a manner
nd fashion that the servant could understand;
6)

th~t

a master is held to the knowledge that a

ervant has a duty to obey orders and that if it
ives okders in a fashion which it knows cannot be
tde:rstood by its servant,

it is responsible for

tjuries sustained by reason of a

comprehend

lack of ability

o

Instructions were prepared on each of the
ove theories and presented to

urt refused to grant a single,

em.

the court.

The

solitary one of

No instruction was given that covered or

rported to cover any of appellant's theory..

The

.y instruction which was given and which would

.ate in any manner to the right of appellant
recover, was submitted by the respondent and

12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

oust be held to cover the respondent's theory of
lppellant' s ca.seo

Certainly,

:o cover any of appellant 3 s

it cannot be said

theorieso

This in-

Jtruction submitted by the respondent was the
:ourt's instruction number 12 and was excepted
.o by the appellanto

In giving that instruction,

he court withdrew two instructions prepared
y it which although inadequate were more
cceptable to the appellanto
rovides

Instruction 12

~

"You are instructed that some evidence has
been received to the effect that plaintiff was
in the act of loosening a stone immediately
prior to the time that he was injuredo
This
fact, in and of itself, is not sufficient
to prove the defendant was negligento
Before
you can find that the defendant was negligent,
you must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant in some way
directed plaintiff to loosen or remove a
stone and that at said time the defendant's
roadmaster knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, that the removal
of said stone would expose plaintiff to an
unreasonable risk of harm"
Where, might it be asked,

is any reference

:I.e to the theory of safe method of work?
Where does the instruction contain any refer:e to the duty of the employer when more than
~method

of work, one of which is dangerous,
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13

is

available to the employer, who elects the dangerous
~ourse?

Where is any reference made to the doctrine of
1nnecessa:ry risk?

Where does the court purport to instruct
·elative to the duty of an employer in framing and

iving orders?
Obviously the instruction given ignores these
uestionso

It does not purport to cover any theory

pon which appellant based his claim of recoveryo
The effect of the instruction is to minimize
he direct, positive,

and unequivocal testimony

f the appellant that he was ordered and in-

tructed by the respondent's roadmaster to leave
safe place at the top of the pile where he was
1lling stones, and to dislodge a particular
:one pointed to by respondent • s roadmaster, which
s at the bottom of the pile, and that in followg orders he was knocked down by a rock which

ruck him in the backo

The instruction de-

eciates and ignores appellant's theory relating
the direction and control of his acts by the
spondent's agent and the testimony relating
~reto,

and
by inference would indicate that
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uch testimony and theory on the part of the
ppellant were of no consequenceo
Respondent must be held to have knowledge of
.ts own testimony and its own theory.

Yet,

the

.nstruction requested by the respondent and given
y the court flies squarely in the face of facts

hich the respondent's roadmaster admitted to be
rue, namelY that it was dangerous for anyone to
oll a rock from the bottom of the pile or in any
ay to get in front of the rocks as they were
eing rolled down the slope.

Respondent conceded

lese facts to be true and offered the evidence

:self, yet, nevertheless,

the respondent made

lowledge of these facts a fact to be found by a
1ry preliminary to finding any possible liabilityo

Finally, it is submitted that Instruction 12
s erroneous when it made the sole test of liality the exposure of the appellant to an unasonable risk without making any effort to advise
e jury as

to how they should determine what

reasonable risk was.

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

II o .~.u,., ~ vun J:' :i,Ji~:c.:u J:~ i\E :r u 3 ING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF' S
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 3 RELATING TO THE
DUTY OF THE EMPLOYER TO FURNISH A SAFE PLANi·,QR
METHOD FOR DOING THE WORK REQUIRED
One of the basic theories of appellant was

hat the respondent railroad as an employer had a
uty or obligation to provide a safe method or
.anner for doing

the work required and that if

uch duty was not met by the respondent,

guilty of negligenceo

as

that it

It was further

ppellant's theory that where as here there were
lternative methods available and especially where

here, one way was safe and the other known to
dangerous that it was negligence on the part of
employer to use or require the dangerous method

te

be usedo

at obligation, in fact,

did rest upon the

sponden t ?

In Fisher v. Minneapolis & S.Lo Ry Co. ,199 F(2)

!,

the plaintiff was a member of a crew engaged

unloading transmission line poles from a flat
The poles were about 58 feet in length and
.ghed about 3000 pounds each.

While on the cars,

poles were held in place by wires and bands.
plaintiff climbed upon the load and cut the
16
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Last of the retaining bandso

Not being held,

the

logs rolled free and in the confusion plaintiff was
~illedo

Plaintiff sued on the theory that a safe

,e tho d for do in g
'he

t he work had n o t

b .e en em p 1 o y e d o

Circuit Court held:
"But it cannot be questioned as to all such
operations that a safe method must be adopted
and proper direction and efficient tools
supplied by anyone who contracts for and
undertakes performanceo
Q

In Jefferson

Vo

o

."

City of Raleigh, NoC.,

ne plaintiff was employed as a laborero

140 SE 7E

In the

)urse

of his duties he was directed to take a

Ledge

and assist the foreman to cut some pile.,

te foreman held a wedge on the pipe
lged

o

While en-

in striking the cleaver with the sledge a

iver of steel was knocked loose, striking
aintiff in the eye and blinding himo
dgment for plaintiff,
e Supreme Court,

From a

the defendant appealed.

in affirming the judgment,

a ted:

"The law of the state is that an employer
of labor is required to exercise reasonable
care in providing reasonably safe methods
of and means to do the worko
Thus in Noble
Vo Lumber Co.
151 NC 76, 65 SE 622 it is
said "It is elementary learning that it is
the duty of the master to furnish his
servant with a reasonably safe method, so far
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

as practicable,

for doing his worko"

It cannot be denied that a safe method did
1

fact exist in the instant case and it had been

;ed.

Again,

the court in A.T. & SF Ry Coo v.

:ruder, 213 F(2)

250 had before it a

similar

Plaintiff was injured while unloading

·oblem.

car of the defendanto

Pipe was

loaded in a car

ilt for carrying ice and perishables.

s done by plaintiff,

akeman.

To unload,

a brakeman,

and a head

plaintiff took the forward

d of a bundle and carried it

the car for

The work

to the rear corner

the purpose of shortening the

!t:lap beyond the doorwayo

In order to get his

I of pipe through the door,

he was obligated to

:t the bundle to a position well over his head

.le the other man held the rear end close to the
or.

In the exercise of twisting

to accomplish

task, plaintiff suffered injury to his back.
The court

found:

"The theory of the suit is that the carrier
was negligent in causing heavy pipe of such
length to be placed in a car of the character
and dimensions of the ~eefer, rather than in
a flat car,

or a gondola,

18

or a box car;
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and

that appellee sustained his injury in con=
sequence thereofc
"(1) Appellant calls attention to admissions
of the appellee and of Scott to the effect
that there was "nothing wrong with the inside
of the car
no slush, mud, or slippery
substance on the floor or any shortcomings
of that sort", hence it is said there was
admittedly no failure on appellant's part to
furnish appellee with a safe place to worko
Of course, the reefer was not, per se, unsafeo
Whether unsafe or no was a matter dependent
on the nature of the freight carriedo
Cfo
Blair Vo Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Coo, 323
U.S. 600, 65 SoCto 545, 89 L.Edo 490.
The
car afforded no hazard to the loading or unloading of package or other freight which could
without substantial difficulty be put through
the doorso
But the jury might have reasonably
found that it was neither suitable nor safe
for the handling of the lengthy bundle of
heavy pipe appellee was obliged to wrestle
with in the manner heretofore indicated. o"
=

0

Here the plan or method of doing the work
s found to be unsafeo

The area was found to be

fe, something that cannot be said of the area
question here - yet the court upheld liability
on the theory that the carrier could be held
able because it could be found
~ligent
1t

in

that it was

loading its freight cars with freight

c 0 u 1 d. no ·:: :) e u ::.1 1 o ad e d w i thou t

·easonable st:raino

u nne c e s sa r y or

In other words,

the carrier

osed ln unnecessary risk upon the plaintiffo
Here the. uses of an improper method of transSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1q

•ortatlon ana 1oaa1.ng came under scrutinyo
~ail:road

was found negligent in not using a car

:hat could have bee.n unloaded with safetyo
,ms no thing wr on g w i t h the c a r
e~

The

There

or the f r e i g h t ,

se, but when improperly mixed,

the witches'

roth resulting produced injury for which the

arrier was 1 iab leo

The plaintiff in Khan

Vo

S.P. Co., Cal,

82 P(2) 78 sued for a loss of eye due to retinal

etachment which he alleged was the result of
trauma resulted from his eye

rauma and that the

aing struck by a particle of concrete dislodged
:-om a concrete floor when a heavy piece of steel
~11

against the floor near where he was working .

. aintiff was moving couplers from a disorganized
.le three or four

feet high which had been un-

aded by a magnetic

crane.

ing moved by hand trucks

o

The couplers were
Plaintiff was

rking on the project which required not only
ving those couplers on the ground but those on
e pi leo

While engaged in lifting a coupler,

other fell and slid from the pile and struck
~

concreteo

Defendant appealed from a

judgment
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~

plaintiffo

T.he

~purt.. sustain~d

the verdict,

ing:
"We think the jury from. the evidence could
reasonably infer that appellant was guilty of
n gligence in sending respondent to work in
the way and in the place describedo It was
reasonably fore~ee~ble that·if a workman were
engaged close to the disorderly pile of
couplers in moving the couplers from the
pile and upending them to be carted away by
the hand truck, some of the couplers, during
the operation, might fall or roll from the
pile and strike either the workman or the
concrete and cause injury to hima
The jury
could conclude that these heavy steel
objects with their irregular conformation
would be beyond the capacity of one man to
handle with safety when they were piled as
they wereo
Certainly the jury could say
that if one started to slip from the top of
the pile the workman could do nothing to
prevent its fall and since he was required
to work close to the pile he could well be
injuredo
Further, they could say that when
an edged steel joist weighing as much as did
these couplers struck a concrete surface
particles of concrete might be projected
with great speed and that it was reasonably
foreseeable that such a particle could strike
a destructive blow to an eyeball if it hit
ito We think the haphazard high piling of
these couplers upon a concrete surface, the
sending of the respondent to work in moving
and disturbing the couplers on the pile in
close proximity to the pile, when considered
in connection with the great weight qf these
objects~ added up to negligent conduct on
the part of appellant, and that the evidence
substantially supports the conclusion by the
jury that by the falling of the coupler and
the blow to appellant 8 s eye such damage as
that blow inflicted was proximately caused
by that negligence." (Underlining added)
21
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In the case at bar there was nothing to foresee

he respondent admitted that working in front of the
ock pile was dangerous

o

Oklahoma recognizes the ruleo

In Jay

Vo

Pope,

klao, 53 P(2) 683, which was followed in Enid

ransfer

&

Storage Co., !nco v. Mollenhauer,

51 P(2) 1068, the plaintiff was the widow of a
an employed by the defendant as a band shover at

compress used by the defendant to bale cotton.
decedent was caught and dragged in to the

1e

>mpresso
~gligent

The plaintiff claimed defendant was
because it failed to provide a safe method

1r doing the work.

Her claim was granted and on

peal the Supreme Court affirmed her position,
ying:
"It is the master's duty to provide a reasonably
safe method for the performance of servants
work and this duty is non-delegable.
The
neglect of this duty imposes a liability
for resulting injuryo
Cosden Pipe Line Co.
v. Berry, 89 Oklao 237, 210 P 141.
There1~was
sufficient evidence for the consideration of
the jury as to the primary negligence of the
defendant in the case in failing to provide
a safe method of operating the press. n
August v. Texas N.D. Ry Coo, Texas, 265 SW(2)
l.

Plaintiff sued for injuries sustained while

:ting car couplings by hand while engaged in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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boxeso
Plaintiff
lifting
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Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah Statewas
Library.
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ouplers so each could be inserted under it for
pu~pose

he

of lifting the end of the caro

udgment for the defendant was sustained, but in
o doing the court stated:
"The common law principle that the master is
under the primary and non-delegable duty to
use reasonable care in providing a sufficient
number of persons to do the particular piece
of work on hand, or in providing reasonably
safe means and methods of work appears to
be also fully accepted as a part of our
fidual perisprudenceo"
Millett v.

Main Cent. R. Co.

laintiff sued for

(Maine) 146 A 903.

injury to his eye and alleged

lat the method of keeping right of way free
~ass

by burning was actionable negligence as

laintiff who was injured by a
re.

from
to

spark striking his

Judgment was for the defendant.

The court

lid:

"An employer is bound to exercise ordinary care
to provide reasonably safe and reasonably
suitable methods,and such only, to enable the
employee to do his work as safely as the
hazards incident to employment will permit."
Io THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF's

INSTRUCTION NUMBER 2 RELATIVE TO THE DUTY OF
THE EMPLOYER TO USE THE SAFER OF TWO AVAILABLE
METHODS ESPECIALLY WHEN ONE OF THE AVAILABLE
METHODS WAS DANGEROUS
As we have seen, it is incumbent upon an

,loyer to provide a safe method of accomplishing
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I

In a proper case,

ts work.
~quire

!

this may

a selection of methods or a determination

E which of several ~thods

however,

two or more -

It can,

should be employed.

alternative
of course,

maintained that this is included within the

>ligation to provide a safe method and to a
~rtain

extent this must be considered,

lere, as here,

however

alternative methods do exist,

:which was dangerous and the other safe,

one

the

.termination or the employment or selection of a

fe method must also be consideredo

Thus,

it is

bmitted that the correct rule is as laid down
Boston & M.RoR.

Co.

Vo

Meech,

A train was backing

2) 109.

1 Cir.

slowly,

s ringing and the lights were one

156

the bell

However,

the

istle was not blown nor was anyone assigned to
ep watch.,
~

The court pointed out that although

train was operated in its customary and usual

lneit', more care could have been taken and that
:h was enough to raise a

jury question.

This view was confirmed in Stone v.

NY Chicago

:t. Louis Ry Co., 344 US 407, 97 L. Edo 441,
S.Cto

358o

Plaintiff was a railroad laborer
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0

claimed damages under the Federal Employers'

ability Act for a back injury sustained in
11 ing ties

o

Evidence of three other ways or

thods of tie removal were introduced differing
:>m the

one complained of.

The plaintiff had

)tested that he was doing all he could.

The

,reme Court of Missouri held that no cause of
:ion was proved.

However,

United States reversed,

the Supreme Court of
stating:

"We think that the case was peculiarly one
for the jury.
The standard of care is negligenceo
The question is what a reasonable
and prudent man would have done under the
circumstances.
Wilkinson Vo McCarthy, 336
US 53, 93 LoEd. 497, 69 S.Cto 413.
The straw
boss had had additional men to put on the
tongs.
He also had three alternative methods
for removing stubborn tieso
This was not
the first difficult tie encountered by the
section crew in this stretch of track.
The
likelihood of injury to men pulling or lifting
beyond their capacity is obvious.
Whether the
straw boss in light of the risks should have
used another or different method to remove
the tie or failing to do so was culpable is
the issue.
To us, it appears to be a debatable issue on which fair minded men would

differo"
And again:

"The fact that the employee commanded to do the
act that caused the injury first protested
does not place the risk of injury on him. 11

25
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In

Ch~cago,

Rock Island & Pacific Ry Coo

Vo

ight, Okla., 278 P(2) 830, plaintiff was a section
ployee under the direction of the foremano

He

d four others were directed to remove some tieso

ey got three sets of tongs and in the process of
agging a tie to place and in lifting it into
sition the tong slipped, causing plaintiff to be
rown to the right of way.

One of plaintiff's

!aries was based upon the failure to provide a
Lsonably safe manner or place for doing the worko
court said:
"A number of witnesses testified that pulling
or dragging a rail along the right of way with
tongs was an improper method to do the work,
and that a better and safer way would be to
roll the rail along the track with the use of
tongs.
"Wheeler, the foreman, although denying that
the rail was dragged fifteen to twenty-five
feet, admitted that if so handled it was an
improper way to make the installation in
questiono
"We are of the view that the evidence was
sufficient to go to the jury on the question
of whether the defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care to provide a reasonably safe
manner or plan for the doing of the work.
Also, whether the defendant exercised
reasonable care to provide safe tools with
which the work was to be done, and whether the
number of employees were sufficient to do the
work in a proper and safe manner
The jury's
finding of negligence and causation are thus·
sustained.
o
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Huskey Vo Heine Safety Boiler Coo, Moo,
1 SW 104lo.

Plaintiff was ordered to place a

lt in a smoke stack by his foreman, who knew that
15 to 20 minutes a platform would be built,

so

at the bolt could have been placed with safetyo

ile plaintiff was attempting to place the bolt,

fello

Judgment for the defendant was reversedo

: court said:

We think that the rule which has been announced a number of times in this state and
which was applied by the court in the case of
Iognus v. Packing Coo, 185 Mo. at pp 99,
170 SW 675 is applicable to this case; the
rule being that if two ways are open to a
person to use,one safe and the other dangerous,
the choice of the dangerous way with knowledge
of the danger constitutes negligence.
This
rule has been generally applied to servants
where they have been held to have been guilty
of contributory negligence, but we can see
no reason why it should not apply as well
to the mastero
In this case, the master in
getting the bolt put in the hole had two ways
openo
One was to order the servant to put it
there, as the testimony tended to show was
done in this case, before the platform was
erected, and under the circumstances this was
a dangerous and hazardous way.
The other was
to wait a short time before giving the order
until after the platform was built, a compara=
tively safe way.
And by adopting the unsafe
way while there was a safe way open must
necessarily leave the question open for the
triers of fact to determine whether a prudent
master would have given the order that the
testimony of plaintiff tends to show was
giveno

27
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Brown v o Co 1 e y, Miss o , 15 2 S

o

61

o

Case whe!'e

>loyee failed to use funnel to pour gas into
:hine aml

was burnedo

The court said:
"·oooand if the master expressly and affirmatively order the servant to omit the safe
method and to do the work in a dangerous
way he has waived, or rather has usurped the
duty otherwise resting on the servant, and
to use a common term, he is estopped to
assert that the duty to avoid the obvious
danger was upon the servant unless the danger
was so imminent that no person of ordinary
prudence should encounter it, even under
orders."
E. J. O'Brien & Co.

sw ( 2)

3 52 .

Vo

Shelton's Admino,

Kyo~

Defendant employed plaintiff's

estate to assist in wrecking a tobacco waresea

Defendant ordered the intestate to climb up

the framing

in the inside of the building and

:k off the iron sheeting with a crowbaro
Le sitting astride the block, it gave wayo
court said:

"While the master cannot be held liable fo:r
failing to furnish a safe place when the
place itself is being demolished or repaired,
yet if he adopts a method for doing the work
which is hazardous when a safer method is
available and the employee is injured by r~ason
of the master's failure to adopt a safer
method, the master is liableo
28
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On the basis of the law heretofore cited, it

submitted that appellant 9 s requested instruction
nber 2 should have been granted in that there is
d was ample evidence to support giving of the

struction, and that the same was not covered or
:luded with any reasonable or proper interpreta>n in Instruction Noo

12 given by the courto

COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
JURY THAT THE MASTER IS GUILTY
IF IT EXPOSES ITS EMPLOYEES TO
RISK AND THAT SUCH DUTY CANNOT

. THE

INSTRUCT THE
OF NEGLIGENCE
AN UNNECESSARY
BE DELEGATED

It has long been the rule that the duty
.ced upon an employer to furnish a safe place to
k includes within its terms

the duty not to

ose its employees to any unnecessary risko
s is a common law rule and it is not new, or the
ult of statutory legislation such as the Federal

loyerst Liability Acto

Thus, in Terrell

Vo

City of Washington, NoC.,
I

SE 888, the plaintiff was employed by the

endant as a lineman with the operation of its
:trical planto

On the day of his injury,

lntiff was ordered to climb one of the poles
the purpose of removing or repairing a wirea
.e he was on top of the pole,

it fell, causing
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?Q

t

e plaintiff serious injurieso

Evidence showed that

e pole was rotten and in bad condition

ches under the groundo
aintiffo

sever~l

Judgment was for the

The court affirmed,

saying:

"The master fails to supply a rtsafe place
for work if he allows work to be conducted
there habitually in a manner needlessly
dangerous to the servantso"
Later in Tate

Vo

Standard Mirror Coo, NoCo,

SE 328, the same court in discussing the charge
the trial court affirmed the rule in these

"Without dissecting the charge and examining
in in detail, it is sufficient to say that
the court charged fully and correctly on the
first issue and in accordance with the
principle we have stated and which is thus
epitomized in Smith Vo Baker, AC 352:
"An employer is bound to carry on his operations so as not to subject those employed by
him to unnecessary risk and he is no less
responsible to his workmen for personal
injuries occasioned by a defective system of
using machinery than for injuries caused by
a defect in the machinery itselfo~
The same problem was before the court in the
ant case of Great A&P Tea Coo v

lr. 199 F(2) 569o

o

McConnell,

There the plaintiff injured

back in an attempt to move a heavy meat block
:he course of her duties in washing down the
.s of defendant's meat shop

o

She claimed
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fendan t was neg 1 igen t
3quate
>Ck~

in fai 1 ing to supply

help to assist plaintiff in moving the
The Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming

lgmen t

for the p 1 a inti f f

»

said :

"The master owes his servant certain inalienable non-assignable duties peculiar to
the relationship based in general upon the
duty not to expose him to unnecessary or
unreasonable riskso"
A similar rule is found· in Williams
~kane,

Washington,

Vo

City of

131 P 833, which was an action

damages for injuries sustained in the erection
a b:ridgeo

The defendant was constructing bridge

rs, and as plaintiff was engaged in loosening
forms and without knowledge that only three
•I

s were
m and

imbed~ed

in the pier, he shoved out the

because the rods could not hold it,

the plaintiff fell

into the rivero

they

Defendant

ealed from a judgment for the plaintiff, but the
:t upheld the verdict,

saying:

"That it is the duty of the master to exercise
reasonable care to furnish the servant a
reasonably safe place of work, and to keep
that place reasonably safe, is law so
familiar as to require no citation of sustaining authorityo

In

tre

prosecution of an

inherently dangerous enterprise reasonable
care is care commensurate with the danger
reasonably to be anticipatedo
In such a case
reasonable care "means great careo"
1
Labatt, Sponsored
Master
& Servant, Para 16, po 30;
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library
Services and Technology
Utah State Library.68
Spr~o-n•"
N~'L7 Vn1r'll& NAct,.. administered
E"R"by theCoo,
Conno345,
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36 A'C.Lo / ' J l , :J/ L.K.Ao 638; · 1 Thompson on
negligence, para 25o"
And

again-~

"This is espec.ially true as applied to the
plan or method of operation deliberately
adopted by the master or his representatives.
When the plan is inherently defective and
unnecessarily dangerous, its adoption is
negligence entailing a liability upon the
master for resulting injuries.
Jobe v.
Spokane Gas & Fuel Co., 131 Paco 235, just
decided; Ball v. Megrath, 43 Washo 107, 109,
86 Pac . 382; Blair Vo Spokane, 66 Wash. 399,
405, 119 Pac. 839; Etheridge Vo Gordon
Constr. Co., 62 Washo 256, 259, 260, 113
Pac. 639; Rogers Vo Valk, 131 Pac . 231, just
decided; 1 Labatt, Master & Servant, para 118."

In Smith v . Southern Illinois & Missouri Bridge
Mo. 30 SW(2) 1077

, plaintiff was employed

a watchman on a bridge.

The tracks on the bridge

e being repaired and considerable material was

:ed on the bridge walk-way between the trackso
le on the bridge plaintiff saw an approaching
.n and started to walk across the tracks to
on another track and out of the way of the

.n.

He slipped on the materials which caused

to fall and be struck by the traino

Plaintiff

med the leaving of the loose wires and other
rials lying around

dangerous.

render~d

the place unsafe

Judgment was affirmed by the

t, which held:
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"Under the instructions given, and under the
custom and practice shown, that the watchman,
on the approach of a train, for his own safety
should cross over to the other track, the
leaving of loose wire or wires connected with
materials lying between the tracks was an
undue enhancement of the dangers to which
plaintiff and others in like employment were
exposed.
No sort of warning light was placed
upon or about any of these materialso
The
performance of plaintiff's duties, under the
circumstances shown, was attended with dangero
Under the duty of the master to exercise
ordinary care to furnish the servant a
reasonably safe place to work, there is included the duty co use all reasonable precautions
which ordinary prudence would dictate, under
the particular circumstances, in respect to
the dangers to be reasonably anticipated and
likely to occur to the servant in the course
of the discharge of his duties . "

And finally,
, 14 5 S 7 0 8 ,

in Simmons

Vo

Doublet & Ewin,

the son of. p 1 a inti f f died whi 1 e

king under a pile driver used by the defendant
the erection of piling necessary for

lding of the State Capitol buildingo
plaintiff was affirmed by the court,

the
Judgment
stating~

"The general rule is that a master must provide
a reasonably safe place to work and must see
that he is not exposed to unnecessary risks in
the course of his employment."
In Yarber v . Chicago & A . Ry Co., 85 NE 928,
~ntiff sued

defendant on the grounds that the

.oyer failed to furnish a safe place in which to
~and

for the additional reason that the foreman
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one of a gang engaged in removing two box cars
istance of 40 feeto

The cars rested on posts

ause the trucks had been removedo

ten the bars in position,

Having

they were raised on

ks and beer kegs were placed under the west end
the car to hold it up.,

One of the kegs fell

plaintiff was ordered under the car to set
the keg, when the car on the jacks fell and
"'as caught and injuredo
t

The court stated in

as follows:
"While the requirement that the place in which
the work must be considered in connection with
the fact that the w9rk was necessarily
attended with some danger, yet it is the duty
of the master to use reasonable care to see
that the servant is not unnecessarily exposed
to danger in doing his work.
If the master
negligently gives an order, in obeying which
the servant is exposed to danger which he
would not otherwise have encountered, the
master may be held liable for an injury
suffered by the servant o"
Can this duty be delegated or transferred?
d be

possible on this ·point to

cases

fill~this

It

brief

unanimously affirming the fact that the

to provide a safe place to work which rests
the employer cannot be delegatedo

It is

ested, however, that perhaps the phraseology
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Butz

Vo

Union Paco Ro Coo, 233 P(2) 332 shows as

i!&rly as any the universality of the tule:

"It is settled beyond question that it is the

duty of the employer to exercise reasonable care
to furnish his employees a reasonably safe
place to work and this includes situations
where the employer sends his employee on the
premises of another to perform his dutieso
2 Sherman & Redfield on Negligence, Revised
Edition, Sections 193 and 202; Albert Miller
& Coo Vo Wilkins, 7 Ciro, 209 F. 582; Porter
v9 Terminal R. Assn of Sto Louis, 327 Illo
App 645, . 65 N. Eo 2d, 31, 33
In the latter
case the court referred to that duty and
stated the proposition very clearly "* * *
and this duty follows the Master even though
the servant is sent upon the premises of
another to do his worko
This duty is nondelegable and affirmative, and must be
continuously fulfilled and positively performed", citing supporting authoritieso 11
o

o

It is submitted that the trial court erred in

using to instruct the jury in accordance with
intiff's requested instructions numbered 1 and So

rHE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
rHAT THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK OF HIS
~MPLOYMENT AND THAT HE WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN
~ONTINUING TO WORK KNOWING THAT HE WAS REQUIRED
ro WORK IN A DANGEROUS OR UNSAFE PLACE

The Congress of the United States, on August 11,
t, amended the Federal Employers'

in particular Section 54 thereof,

Liability Act
to provide

: employees should not be held to have assumed

risk of their employment in any case where
/'1
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I

ury or death resulted in whole or in part from
negligence of an officer, an agent, or an
loyee of a common carrier.
It has long been the law in Utah that one is
ligent to require an employee to perform a
gerous acto

Tuckett v .. American Steam & Hand

ndry, 84 P 500.

Equally long,

indeed from the

e case, it has been established that an employee
not held-guilty of negligence because he places
self in a dangerous position by reason of his
ying an order.

Thus we find Judge Howell,

aking for the court, saying:
"If the order of the master constitutes an act
of negligence, and if the servant obeys it,
and by reason of such obedience is injured,
he can count upon such an act of negligence
when he brings an action to recover for his
injury.
In order, however, to recover, he
must show that the obeying of the order was
the proximate cause of the injury."

The court went on to quote with approval the
Lowing language of Labatt, Master and Servant,
:ion 439:
"It follows from what has been said that even
if we might have said that the plaintiff did
not act with that carefulness which every one
is legally bound to exercise.
If no order
had been given by the master to act just as
she did, the giving of such an order prevents
us from saying so.
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The views CQntained therein were affirmed in
am v . 0 g den Packing & Pro vi s ion in g C o . ,

din more recent years,

1 7 7 P 2 18

o

the court has adopted the

me position in Kaumans v., White Star Gas & Oil Coo,

P(2) 231:
"We are

likewise of the opinion that the
evidence fails to establish as a matter of
law that plaintiff was negligent in obeying
defendant's orders because of the danger
necessarily involved in the work ordered
doneo
It is well settled that a servant is
not negligent in obeying the directions of
his employer or superior unless the danger
involved was" 'so absolute and imminent that
injury must almost necessarily' have resulted
to him by following" such directions.
Toone v o
J.O. O'Neill Canst. Co., 40 Utah 265, 121 P
10, 16; Fowler Vo Union Portland Cement Co.,
39 Utah 363, 117 P 462; Pascoe v. Nelson,
52 Mont. 405, 158 P 317; Storey v. Williams
Bros., !nco (Mo.Appo) 50 SW(2) 698.
The
mere fact that the servant was aware that he
was exposing himself to danger does not make
him guilty of contributory negligence.
Toone
v. J.O. O'Neill Canst. Co., supra; Neitzke
v. Kraft-Phenix Dairies, Inc., 214 Wis. 441
2 5 3 NW 5 7 9 o "
These views have been contended and affirmed

the courts in liability action cases.
see in S c h i r r a v

0

D • L .,..& WT

Ry Co . ,

Thus

1 0 3 Fe d . Sup p ., 8 12 •

inti££ was employed as a machinist and on
ober 25, 1950 was engaged with others in moving
engine from a stall where it was being repairedo
las necessary to raise the engine and place rails
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.1..

.:a.\;

g en~r a

J..

:co reman

told the assistant

reman to jack up the wheelso

The latter went to

e plaintiff artd ask·ed -him how he got about that

d plaintiff suggested placing a block and jack
raise it and then putting dead rails to cross
e pito

gineo

Plaintiff was then told to come .to the
During the operation plaintiff suggested

ey needed more stability and the assistant

reman said to hurry it up, and plaintiff said
K." "Jack it up"o

In the process, a piece used

a level on top of the jack slipped out of place
d injured plaintiff.

Defendant claimed the plaintiff solely
~ligent

because he gave the order to jack it

, and that he could not shift the responsibility
the defendant,

and that he acted voluntarily.

The court held not so.

That it was not the

.sing of the jack that caused the trouble,

failure to level the blockingo

!

~t

but

That the claim

plaintiff was acting voluntarily was another
of saying that he assumed the risk which

ense was

outlawed by statuteo

Finally, it

d:

38
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"In the instant case, though there was no
testimony of an express command by Wrable to
the plaintiff to continue on the job despite
plaintiff's apprehension of the danger
involved, nevertheless the plaintiff could
reasonably infer the same from the position of
the parties and the circumstances involved,
p~~ticularly in view of Wrable's statement,
"It will be all right when the weight is
ono 11
"We haven't got much timeo
We want to
get the engine out of here tonighto"

The doctrine is recognized by the Supreme
u r t. o f
C®o »

the U n i t e d S t a t e s
supra,

o

In Blair

Vo

B&O

the court said:

"It is true that petitioner undertook to do
the work after he had complained to the company
that the pipe should not be moved in the. manner
it was.
But he was commanded to go ahead by
his superiorso
Under these circumstances, it
cannot be held as a matter of law that he
voluntarily assumed all the risks of injuryo
The court below cited by way of comparison
its holding in a former decisiono
Guerierro
Vo Reading Coo, 346 P 187, 29 A(2) 510.
There it had announced the rule that an
employee has a duty to quit his job rather
than do something which he knows or ought to
know is dangerouso
This court does not apply
the doctrine of assumption of risk
so
rigorously."
Since that decision,

the doctrine of assumption

risk was abolished by statutory amendment.
·ely, plaintiff's position cannot be held to be

se than it was before the enactment of the
tutea

That is not the lawa
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In Pritt

va.,

Vo

·western Virginia Northern Ry Co.,

51 SE(2) 105,

the court said:

"The plaintiff herein was under the direction
of the conducter of the train and when he was

ordered by the conducter to place the Norfolk
& Western car under the tipple it was his
obligation to bbey that order, and he did soo
Apparently no one realized the danger that
was involved in the direction of the conducter
to plaintiff until it was too late to avoid
the accident.
If it be contended that the
plaintiff should have observed the danger
and that he assumed the risk, we are met by
Title 45, U.S.C.A., Seca 54 which provides
ambng other things that such employee shall
not be held to have assumed the risks of h~
employment in any case where such injury or
death resulted in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officers, agents or
emp 1 o y e e s of such carrier ...
n
0

Finally, we submit Ericksen
ll), 246 P(2)
~

o

Vo

S.P. Co.

Plaintiff, an employee,

692o

sued

injuries sustained on the premises of another.

Lintiff was a tee inspector and was hurt while
:pecting tees on the premises of a lumber company
had piled tees on

the edge of the dock.

He

previously had difficulty and hAd complained
his supervisoro
ce

The defendant contended that

plaintiff had knowledge and that the pre-

es were not in its control,

bleo

that it was not

The court disagreed:

40
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"The plaintiff's knowledge of the unsafe
condition of the premises does not relieve
the defendant of liability.
Since 1939 the
defense of assumption of risk has been barred
under the Acto 45 U.S.C Ao 54.
No subsequent
decision has been cited which as a matter of
law relieves an employer from liability due
to dangers known to the employer simply
because those dangers were also known to
the employee
o

''

And again:
"The question therefore is whether the
defendant is liable under the Act when it
knowingly required the plaintiff to work
on unsafe premises of a third party and the
employee also knew of the danger.
State
court ~ecisions in applying common law
principles are not controlling in the
presence of a clear and plain duty under the
acto
It may be assumed that the common law
non-liability doctrine in the absence of
direct control applies where the employer has
no notice or knowledge of unsafety or dangero
But a conclusion of non-liability under the
act where the employer requires the employee
to work on premises known by the employer to
be unsafe would amount to disapproval of the
authorities which have recognized liability
in such cases.
No exception is made when
the employee also knows of the unsafe condition but has no alternative except to work
in the place of dangero
The benefits of the
Act are not to be withheld in contravention
of the plain intent of the act and contrary
to its application in other caseso
To do
so would be to permit employers, otherwise
subject to the act, with impunity to require
their employees to work in places of known
danger, so long as the unsafe premises-are
not under the employer's direct controlo
In cases of known dangerous prem~ses belonging to the third party, the absence of
direct control does not absolve the defendant
from liability under the acto"
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It is respectfully submitted that the trial
rt erred in refusing to give plaintiff's rested instruction number 6o

VIa THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED
13 AND 14
The respondent had no theory except that
raced in Charlevois'

story that he waved his

and shouted "Get out"

to the appellant and that

reafter appellant started on a perilous journey
his own.

Apparently the theory was

that if

•

appellant could not hear or understand and
a result of these deficiencies was injured,
t

the responsibility was his and his alone.
This is a version that a

jury could in the

ence of correct instructions apply to
allant' s theory.
~lusion

the

A jury could come to the

that appellant merely thought he was

!red to pull the rock from the bottom of the
~and

that by reason of his misconstruction of

supervisor's orders,

he was injuredo

Neither the court nor

the respondent en-

'ored to correct this misconception.

The

!llant endeavored to do so but his requested
.ructions
were refused .
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The dif·ficulty with respondent's theory is that

a. ssumes too muc.hc

It assumes that an employee

, full and complete responsibility to hear,
lerstand and obey any order or command given him

a s up e rior,

even though he be deaf,

dumb and

nd, and that having given an order or command
employer can sit complacently and smugly by t~cted

m an

from all the consequences that flow
It assumes that in issuing an

order~

er there is no duty imposed upon the giver to
e it clearly,

to see that it is heard and

erstood, to take into consideration the
ilties or infirmities of the person to whom it

siven or to realize that some response is obli-

): y upon its recipient and to guard against
1gful ambiguity or incomprehensibility.
~espondent's

The

roadmaster was an intelli-

:, capable person who had risen from the ranks of
,mmon labor e r
.nee-r.

to that of Assistant Division

His intellect

· far above

~ nd

ability must have

the average employee .

He we1s the

est ranking officer of the respondent on the

eQ

The

ro~dmaster

knew of his own language
43
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mitations.

He expressed some doubt as to

milar limitations on the part of the appellant

d his co-employees, and this doubt alone should
ve given him pauseo

However,

it is submitted

at when this doubt is weighed in consideration of
1 the facts

that the mist of doubt dissolves

d the fact of knowledge appearso

All of the men on the crew had been employees
the respondent
neo

for a considerable period of

The roadmaster was in direct and personal

arge of all the section crews in his area.
>ellant's foreman, Leyva, was personally re>nsible to himo

He was in charge on the ground

all operations in his area similar to that
.ng conducted that day by his men.

He paid, or

:ued the pay checks, directly to the men.

He

, present and he heard Leyva address the em-

yees in the Spanish language, which would have
n an obviously unnecessary act if the employees
e conversant with Englisho

Finally, as a sort

superintendent or officer in charge, he and the
pondent must be held to have had knowledge of
nature, character, abilities and type of person
er his immediate jurisdiction and controlo
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It

d be absurd

to contend that he had no knowledge

he language limitations of his Indian, Mexican
Spanish subordinateso
Notwithstanding

these facts, he permitted the

•

supervisory employee who could readily commute with his men to depart from the scene and

he assumed the active direction and control
1e work when he knew that he

lacked means of

Jnication with his meno
It is well established law that a master may
!ld responsible for negligence in the giving
rders.

As is stated in "Naval Leadership",.

c:t of the U

o

S

Naval Academy:

"The giving of a command requires a commander

to speak with assurance, firmness, in a clear
tone of voic~, and loudly enough so that every
man who is expected to execute that command
can hear."

The Naval Watch Officers' Guide, another
lard Navy pub 1 i cation ,

states :

"The manner

in which you give commands is
important.
Speak clearly, loud enough to be
heard, and with a positive, incisive voiceo"
Speaking specifically,

they make the additional

ment:
"Nowhere in the Navy is exact phraseology as

45
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important as it is to the conning officer in
giving commands to the helmsman or engine
order telegraph watch, because misunderstandings or ambiguity can be so quickly
disastrous there must be no possibility of
a mistaken meaning o"
These rules would seem to be so self-evident
10 t

to admit to any argument that the rules are

for military personnel but have no place in

!

:yday lifeo

It would seem so simple as to

1ire no explanation that an order or a command
1ot a command unless
~rstand
~s

the recipient can hear and

that a command is being given and that

being directed to him.
Labatt, Master and Servant, Section 1159,

lking of the sufficiency of the warning

states·~

"The extent of the master's obligation in
regard to imparting information to a servant
is to give him such instruction as will
enable him to avoid injury.
If the master
relies on the fact that he admonished the
servant of the danger which caused the
injury, he must show that the warning was
timely and explicito
Merely going through
the form of giving instructions is not
sufficient o"
Indeed, if an order is not understood,

it has

:ffect as an ordero

In Upton Vo Conway Lumber Co., NoH.,

128 A 802

dgment in favor of plaintiff was affirmed ~n the
nd among others that proper warnings or in-

ction
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ourt said:

"It is undoubtedly true that the servant must
show, inferentially at least, that his ignoranc®
is justifiable under the circumstanceso Camire
Vo Laconia Car Coo 1l 79 NoHo 531Sl 11 Ao 340o
But this is far from saying that he must elucidate in advance every conceivable circum~
stance which might tend to endow him with
knowledge.
It is not necessary for him uto
assert his ignorance in te:rms" (Bjork Vo U.,So
Bobbin & Shuttle Coo, 79 N.Ho 402, 406, 111 A.
284, 533), nor is his lack of knowledge ard
appreciation inexcusable merely because express
warning and instruction have been giveno
In
all cases the warning or instruction must be
sufficient~.~o fully inform the servant of
dangero
Willis Vo Plymouth & Compton Telo
Exch. Coo, 75 N.Ho 453, 455, 75 Ao 877, 30
LoR.Ao (NoS.) 477 o
But if instead of receiving instruction from the master, he
obtains through other channels sufficient
knowledge to understand and appreciate his
peril, he cannot recovero
Paige Vo Coo 80
NoH. 439, 119 A. 303o
On the other hand, there
are occasions where any warning the master may
give is insufficiento
Richardson Vo Adams,
77 N.H. 571, 94 A. 967."

The same result was reached by the Supreme Court
·isconsin in Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wisconsin Iron
reWorks, 129 NW 6l5o The problem involved was
tantially the same and again in affirming a
ment for the plaintiff, the court held:
"An insufficient w.arning is in legal effect
equivalent to no warningo
McDougall v.
Ashland, etc . , Co., 97 Wiso 387, 73 N .W. 327;
Fox Vo Peninsular, etc., Works, 84 Mich. 676~
48 N.W. 203; James v. Rapids Lumber Co.~
SO La. Anno 717, 23 South. 470, 44 L.R.Ao 81
and notes; Wolski v. Knapp-Stout & Co., 90
Wiso 178, 63 N.W. 87." .
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h..7

An·d again:

"Here the warning to be of any value must have
been sufficiently specific to apprise an
ordinarily prudent person possessing the experience of decedent of the nature of the
change made or the danger to be apprehendedo
Any other warning would have been quite an
idle ceremonyo"

The master must do more than merely speak

lrly so that the servant can hear o

He must also

into consideration the servant's age,

!

~e,

intelli-

and ability to comprehendo

The rule is stated in Sadler

Vo

Lynch, Vao,

)E(2) 669:

"The sufficiency of the warning may depend
upon a number of factors such as the intelligence and experience of the servant and the
nature of the dangero"
A similar rule was laid down by the Circuit
~t

in Grant Storage Battery

Vo

DeLay, 87 F(2) 726

.ntiff was et;nployed by the defendant in its
·age battery company factory in Omaha and he was

elled to leave his employment by reason of
~

poisoning

o

One of plaintiff's grounds for

igence was an alleged neglect of duty upon the
of the defendant to warn plaintiff as to the
er arising from lead poisoningo

Defendant

d to withdraw the issue from the jury on the
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~

unds that p1a1nt1tt *aSltully
reciated the danger .

The Supreme Court in

olding that contention that by
t

w~rned and

~eason

of the

that plaintiff wa~ a high school graduate with

vious experience who could read and who h~d

eived a letter of instruction warning him of
. difficulty,

stated~

"The sufficiency of c~ution, warning, o:r instruction of an employee, or its necessity,
may depend upon a number of factors, including the age, intelligence, and experience
of the employee~ the nature of the danger~ the

character of the work to which the employee
is assigned, and other circumstanceso"

The court, howeverj on the above facts, concluded

"As has been observed, plaintiff was neither
young, inexperienced,
in intelligenceo"

illiterate, nor

lacking

"This notice gave him both warning and instruction, and with this notice, being of
mature years and intelligent, he had the same
knowledge relative to the danger attendant

upon his occupation which his employer had,
and this warning or instruction certainly
gave him reasonable notice of the danger of
his employment arising from lead poisoningo
Not only did he understand the notice and in=
structions, but he claimed in his evidence
to have heeded them to some extent at leasto"
It should be
~r

appa~ent

or instruction in a

·ant is unable

to

that when one gives an
language thci,t he knows his

understand~

that

the giver is
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The problem of difference in

.igent.

langu~ge

the basis of litigation in In Re Panasuka, Masso
NE 386

The plaintiff, Panasuka, was

o

injur~d

.e in the employ of the Tauton Wool Stock Companyo
,Jinter became embedded in his hand resulting
~ain,

swelling, and an abcess which required a

;ical operation and dressingo

The doctor who

.ted him presented the bill to the plaintiff

The plaintiff sought to recover this

paid it .

.n: from the emp layer and its insurance car:rie:r

o

Industrial Accident Board found that the
.icant was an illiterate foreigner who was
le to read, write or understand the English

uage and he had no notice or information as
ow to proceedo

A notice to employees was

ted in English - was posted in a place where

employees worked.

The insurance carrier

ended that there was adequate notice and that
as not responsible

o

The Supreme Court of

achusetts rejected this contention, stating:
"The o b 1 i gat ion to fur n i s h medic a 1 and h o s p i t a 1
se~vices

for the fi&$t two weeks after the
injury is imposed on the insurer by the express
words of the Acto
This duty must be performe.d
or reasonable efforts made to that end befor~
the statutory obligation is satisfiedo "Furcnish"
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means to provide or .supplyo
Its significanc~
may vary with the connection in which it is
foundo
It is used heie to describe a duty
placed upon an insurer ~especting a workman
who receives "a personal injury arising out of
or. in the course of his employmentou
Such Bl.
person manifestly is p~esumed by the Act to
be under more or l~ss physical disability 2nd
hence not in hi~ normal condition of ability
to look out for himselfo
The word nfu1rnish"
in such connection imports something more than
a p~ssive willingness to respond to a demando
It implies some degree of active effort to
bring to the injured person the required
humanitarian relief.
Reasonably sufficient
provision for rendering the required service
must of course be madeo
Then either express
notice must be given to the employee or there
must be such publication or posting of the
information as warrants the fair inference
that knowledge has reached the employeeo
If
the insurer had made adequate arrangements fo~
the care of those to whom the duty is owed in
the event of injury, and then by conspicuous
notices suitably posted in places frequented
by the employee in a language capable of
being read by him, has given full information
of that fact, and directions as to steps to
be taken by an injured person in order to
avail himself of these arrangements, a very
different question would be presentedo
Thi~
might go a long way toward proving complia~ce
with the requirements of the statuteo
But
in the case at bar the notice appears not to
have been of a character to challenge attention,
although perhaps it might have been enough if
the employee had been able to read the English
languageo
The insurer has readily accessible
means for ascertaining the nationality of
employees insured by i t and their degree of
intelligenceo
If among them are those who
can no t r e ad o :r s p e a k the Eng 1 i s h 1 an g u a g E· "
this circumstance r~quires g~eater effo~t on
its part in order to comply with the st~tuteu
Beers Vo Isaac Prouty Company, 200 Masso 19»
85 N . E . 8 6 4 , 2 0 L R A
N. S
3 9 , 1 2 8 Am S t
Repo 374o"
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What is the real difference between the spoken
the written word?

If a notice printed in a

guage a person cannot

re~d

is not adequate, how

an order given in a. language one cannot combend be deemed adequate?

This is especially true in cases involving the
ing of orders because the employee has a duty
give obedienceo
In Leonidas

Vo

Gro

Northern Ry Coo,

72 P(2)

7, where a section laborer filed an action for
Jries, alleging that he was injured by reason
the negligence of the foreman

:.arry ties without assistance,

in ordering him
the court said:

"Ordinarily, an employ·ee has a right to as~ume
that he may safely act under the direction of
the foremano
Sorenson Vo Northern Pacific Ry
Co., suprao
In 18 R. CoL. 655, the au thor h£3!.S
well stated princi2les which we think apply
to this caseo
It is there said:
·•rt is a
fundamental of the relation of master and
servant that the servant shall yield obedience
to the master and this obedience an employee
may properly accord even when confronted with
perils that otherwise should be avoided.
In
any case, but more plainly when a command is
sudden and there is little or no time for
reflection and deliberatiori, the employee may
not set up his judgment against that of his
recognized superiors; on the contrary, he m~y
rely·upon their advice, assurances and commands,
notwithstanding m~ny misgivipgs of his owno
It
by no means follows that because he could
justify disobedience of the order he is barred
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of recovery for injuries received in obeyingo
He is not required to balance the degree of
dang·er and~· d'ecide.whether it is safe for him
t 0 a~ t !i b u ~' he . ' i s . 'r
i e v e d in a. me a s u r e 0 f t h e'
usual obligation of exercising vigilance to
detect an~. avoid.da~gero
Ordinarily, he may .
assume that the employer has superior knowledge
and rely thereQn; especially when the act i~
one that could be made safe by the exercise of
special care on the part of the employero
The
employee may assume that such care will be
takeno
Again, it is a psychological truth
that employees form a habit of obedience that
overcomes independent thought and action,
depriving them of power to exercise intelligence that otherwise would protect them."

e'l

There may be negligence in giving orders or
:uctionso

In this case the negligence was proved

Lggravated by the incompetency of the roadmaster
.ve any order due to his inability to speak and
·stand Spanish.

The rule as to competency is set forth in
J. Master and Servant,

Section

342~

"It is the duty of an employer to select and
retain competent employees, and when one is

injured by a fellow employee who, the evidence
shows» was not competent to perform the service
in which he was ~ngaged, and the injury to the
victim was attributable to his incompetency, a
recovery against the employer may be had~
provided it is fu~ther made to appear that the
employer knew, or is chargeable with knowledge,
of the incompetency of such fellow employee.
and that the injured employee did not know,
actually or constructively of such incompetency.
Incompetency on the part of the co-employee is
d!emed to be the equiv~lent of insuffici~ncy or
defectiveness in respect of an appliance or
place ofSponsored
working
As has been said:
"In a
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'-'"'

knowingly employs servants who are incompetent
reason of their habits or otherwise~ he is
liable for an injury occasioned to a fellow
servant by their incompetency just as he would
be liable for an injury caused by a defective
machine."

by

However, it is even more succinctly stated in

.J., Master and Servant, 352,
does not possess

that an employee

the capacity to understand

~nd

the rules of his superiors, is lacking in general
ation, or is ignorant of the language that is
Jmarily employed may be held to be incompetent
in the rules statedo

Thus in Pullman Coo v. Ransaw, 203 SW 122,
aw filed a suit against the Pullman and Texas &
fie Railway Company for damages suffered by being
~ally

arrested by appellant's watchman, and by

>n of a gunshot wound.

The defendant's watchman

!jected plaintiff from the car and in so doing

him, was not able to read or speak the English
1ageo
~ht

The court found that both employees had

to be where they were and that the accident

llly was caused because neither was able to
~

the language of the other, and each was

tg in the 1 ine of duty
~diet

o

The court, in sustaining

for the plaintiff stated:
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"We think the incompetence of the watchman is
made clear in view of the fact that he could not
speak the ·same language of the porter and in
connection with their conflicting dutieso
Ruling Case Law, vol. 18, Po 621 states the rule:
"If a master knowingly employs servants
who are incompetent by reason of their habits,
or otherwise, he is liable for an injury
occasioned to a fellow servant by their in~
competency just as he would be liable for any
injury caused by a defective machineo"

"Ignorance of the language customarily employed
is held to constitute incompetency.
Ruling
Case Law, vol o 18, p. 727, and cases referred to
under note l9on
In this case we are not confronted with the
.em of knowledge or
.e

the lack of it on the part

employer, nor are we confronted with the

em of the fellow servant rule.

Charlevois,

admaster, was in charge of an entire area for
efendant and entrusted with its proper supern, and Charlevois knew and was fully aware of the
age barrier existing between himself and the
yees at the

time he undertook their active

1al and direct supervision.
[t

would be a complete absurdity to contend

in

employer can be held liable for the in-

:ency of a menial servant and cannot be held
!

for the incompetency of a superior supervisory
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ligence is more culpable,
>lved by Richard Vo

Ao 88 o

~nd

any doubt is

Amoskeag Mfgo Coo, 79 N.Ho

380

The plaintiff did not speak Englisho

:he noon hour approached,

,any rules,

she,

in violation of

left her place of work to go to the

The defendant's foreman, who was unable to
.k her language,

and who apparently

recogni~ed

she could not understand and did not speak

ish, attempted to compel her to return to her
e of duty.

In the process, he exerted more

e than was necessary, and plaintiff sued the
ndant to recover for her injurieso

The employer

ended that the act of its foreman constituted an

ult and battery and as a result was without the
!

of his employment, and that consequently it

tot negligent or liableo

lampshire disagreed,

The Supreme Court of

stating:

"When the plaintiff quitted her work it was
Smith 9 s duty to call her attention to her viola~
tion of the rule of the room and in some way to
request her to resume her proper place
To
make the request verbally would have been
ineffective because she did not understand the
Eng 1 i s h 1 an g u ag e
the on 1 y 1 an g u a g e he c o u 1 ,,~1• u s e
He was obliged to resort to some other means of
informing her of his request, as, for inst~nce~
by putting his hand upon her and leading or
0

$)

56
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pushing her back to the position she had
wrongfully lefto

The use of some degree of

physical force might reasonably be found to
have been authorized by the defendant, and it
follows, in accordance with the defendant 8 s
a~gument and the authorities above referred to,
that the defendant would be liable for

the
excessive and unreasonable force used by Smith
in the performance of his duty to the defendantou
It is submitted that appellant was entitled to

his proposed instructions 13 and 14 to the jury
that the omission of these instructions seriously

ardized his right of recovery.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF·
A NEW TRIAL BY REASON OF THE MISCONDUCT OF A
JUROR

At each recess, the court instructed the jury,
1ant to the provisions of Rule 47K,
~vil

Utah Rules

Procedure, which provides as follows:

"(k} SEPARATION OF JURY.

If the jurors are
permitted to separate, either during the trial
or after the case i~ submit ted to them, they
shall be admonished by the court that it is
their duty not to converse with or suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other person
on any subject of the trial, and that it is
their duty not to form or express an opinion
thereon until the case is finally submitt~d
to them."

Notwithstanding the p~ovisions of the Rule and
nstructions of the court, and although the
at one stage advised the jurors that violation
e Rule could result in imprisonme.nt,

on the
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~j

ld day of trial at the noon recess,
~or

came up

the steps from the lower landing to ,· ·

,£ the counsel for
~~case
~ving

5)

and asked him

(SoTro

an answer he then stated:

5)

Upon

"I know all

have a brother on the jury" o

I

A few minutes

1se his brother
;0

the respondent,

had gone to the jury.

: your case ~.

a brother of

later he expressed concern

seemed to be picked on :railroad

A private conversation in lowered tones

!d during which the words "That old Mexican"

mentioned (SoT:ro

S)o

Is it not significant

the appellant was a 63 year old Mexican?

A

lays later when confronted with the witness who
,v~rheard

the conversation,

;pea.ker as an attorney,

and who identified

he appeared embarrassed

:oncerned upon seeing the witness.

(S.Tr

7).

All of this testimony was contained in affidavits
;worn testimony which was
.nationo

The evidence was not denied and

:fore stands admittedo
~wing

subject to cross

questions:

These facts present the

(1) How did the

juror's brother

that counsel was trying a railroad case?

(2)

id he know his brother was a juror on a T.ailcase?
t by

(3)
How did he know all about the case
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set. forth in

own statement, as a result of conversations
n

his brother.

Mexican"?
ir~assed

(4) Why discuss privately "An

(5) Why was the juror's brother

and upset upon seeing the witness who

rd part of the conve::sation?

It is possible that there is an innocent
Lanation for all of these highly unusual

events~

in the absence of any explanation which
•ondent did not choose to make,
:ed

it is sub-

that the conversation must stand upon the

.tted facts and the logical inferences that must
.educed therefrom.

In Panko Vo Flintco Co., N.J., 80 A(2) 302, the
ndant moved for a new trial by virtue of mis-

uct of a juroro

The facts as finally adduced

that a brother in law of a juror had phoned an
ranee adjustor relative to the question of innee from downstairs while the juror was upstairs
ing, but did not disclose any of the facts of

conversation to the juror, although some referto the case was made, namely that the juror was
lng in the trial of the case,

the character of

:ase, and the names of the parties.

The only
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~een

the brother in law and the juror prior to

conclusiort of the caseo

The brother in law

isted he had not mentioned insurance to the
or until subsequent to the termination of the
ion.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey,

in

aking of the telephone call from the brother in
to the insurance adjustor,

said this:

"No rational explanation for

the call is
given, but the inference is inescapable that
it was made for the purpose of getting information ..
oit is beyond belief that having
secured the desired information, Smith did not
give it to his brother in law (the juror),
during. the considerable time they remained
together in the house thereaftero"
00

In the instant c4se no rational explanation

given, in fact no explanation whatsoever was
mo

However, when one couples the statements

'ones' brother with the statement previously
· by Juror Jones to another

juror that he had

.tives who were lawyers and he knew something
t

the law, and this brother's subsequent em-

assment upon being recognized,

the inference

nescapable that the juror had in fact conversed
his brother who was an attorney, and that in so

g he violated the law and the express and direct
ructions of the courto

How could any other
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renee be drawn?

The claim of knowledge was

led with the statement that he had a brother on
juryo
t

,

In the Panko,

supra,

case,

as dl' d the trial court here,

t a new

trial, however,

the tri~l

refused

to

the Supreme Court of

Jersey had no difficulty with the problem and
unanimous decision did reverse and did grant
w trial,

stating:

"It is well settled that the test for determining whether a new trial will be granted
because of the misconduct of jurors or the
intrusion of irregular influence is whether
such matters could have a tendency to influence the jury in arriving at its verdict in
a manner inconsistent with the legal proofs, and
the court's chargeo
If the irregular matter
has that tendency on the face of it, a new
trial should be granted without further inquiry as to its actual effect.
The test is
not whether t~e irregular matter actually influenced the result, but whether it had the
capacity of doing so.
The stringency of this
rule is grounded upon the necessity of keeping
the .administration of justice pure and free
from all suspicion of corrupting practicesQ
It i s sa i d to b e r' imp e r a t i v e 1 y r e q u i r e· d t o
secure verdicts based on proofs taken openly
at the trial, free from all danger by extraneous influenceso 11
Lamphear Vo MacLean, 176
App.Div. 473, 162 NoYoSo 432, 434, (N.Y.Appo
Divo 1916); Gall Vo New York & New Brunswick
Auto Express Coo, 132 NoJ.L. 466, 468, 40
A.2d 643 (E&A 1944; in re Phelan, 126 N.JoL.
410, 411, 19 Ao 2d 792 (Sup .Cto 1941); Den ex
dem. Cox Vo Tomlin, 19 NoJoLo 76'j 80 (SupoCto
1842; Consumers Coal Coo Vo Hutchinson, 36
NoJ.Lo 24, 26, 28 (SupoCt. 1872); Sloan Vo
Harrison~ 1 N.JoL. 123 (Reprint page 145)
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. (Sup . C t. . 1 7· 9 2 ) ; In r e . C o 11 in s , 15 ft. o 2 d 9 8 ,
18 NoJo MiSCo 49.2, ·497 (Cape May Co., Cir.Cto
i940); York v . Wyman, 115 Me. 353, 98 Ao 1024
L.R.Ao 1917B, 246 (Me. 353, 98 Ao 1024) L.R A
i.917B, 246 (Me.Sup.Jtid.Cto 1916); 39 AmJur,
New T·r i a 1 S e c t . 9 6 P . 111 o n

; submitted that if, as the Supreme Court of
Jersey said "The fundamental right of

tri.~l

by

lr and impartial jury is jealously guarded by
:ourts", that it had no alternative but to
new trial unless it desired merely to give

: a

;ervice to a rule and then disregard the same.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had a similar
in Gross

.em

Vo

Moorej) 73 A(2) 221.

In that case

ourt was confronted with a trial where a juror
. niece of an insurance adjustoro

The insurance

tor was seen by the jury to have had a conversawith the juror as well as with counsel for the
se.

The juror and the adjustor admitted the

rsation but stated that it related solely to

Y matters and no contrary evidence was addo

A motion for new trial was denied by the

court again, but again the Supreme Court of a
1:'·

State by an unanimous decision overruled the

court and granted a new trial, stating:
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or gross misbehavior on the part of anyone in
this case, on the facts set forth in the record
and the adqitional facts admitted at the argument
before this Court a new trial will be grantedo
In our opinion, a new trial is required to assure
a fair and impartial trial in fact as well as
in appearance, and to preserve the orderly administration of justice."

Thus it will be seen that two States having an
Jt identical problem to
~mined

the problem at bar have

that the right to an impartial jury trial

, fundamental and such a basic and essential
of the administration of justice that even if
.ppearance is wrong and even though no actual
: can in fact be proved,

·antedo

that a new trial should

Likewise in Whitehead v.

Texas & P. Ry

84 SW(2) 779, the Supreme Court of Texas had a

hat similar problem in that a member of the jury
having stated that he was free from bias or

dice and in the confines of the jury room made
Y inflammatory and improper remarks relative to

tiff and plaintiff's integrityo

All of the other

s testified that the improper remarks did not
t

them or their deliberations in any way and

they did not consider themo

The tenor of their

ts indicated that they intended to find for

the

iant, and would have found for the defendant notSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or's vote was not essential or necessary part of
verdict

o

Notwithstanding these facts which were

disputed by evidence,

the Texas Court of Appeals

ersed, stating:

''We believe it clear that the remarks of Cruce
referred to constituted reversible error.
It
would be a travesty and a reflection on our
whole jury system to uphold a verdict tainted
with such misconduct on the part of a juror who
is selected upon his assurance that he is free
of bias or prejudice toward either of the
partieso
And as repeatedly announced in our
decisions, the verdict is vitiated even if
only one juror is improperly influenced . "
It would seem that the Supreme Court of Calif-

La has in effect adopted a rule slightly different
n that heretofore laid down by New Jersey,

Penn-

1ania and Texas and that the modification may be

:ed as follows:
l

That a case may have misconduct

juror in it but that the decision will not be
aside solely for that reason unless it appears
the conduct of the offending juror was essento the verdict finally rendered.
in the case of Walter

Vo

Thus we see

Avaziam, Calo, 25

526 a new trial was granted, whereas in the

of Kritzer v. Catron, 244 P(2) 808 a new trial
not granted because in the Kritzer case the
ict was 11 to 1 with the offending juror being
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Ill.

wti:J

lone dissenter, and as a result the dissenter• s

1

:e would not have upset or modified the verdicto

is submitted that this verdict made certain basic
1

umptions that are not necessarily justifiedo

:umes,

for example,

It

that the arguments of that

·or did not in fact have effect in the size or the
unt of the verdicto
t

However, notwithstanding

problem under the rule in California as here-

ore set forth,

the plaintiff here would be en-

led to a new trial because in this case the

y was polled and one of the essential votes
essary to sustain the verdict for

the

r~spandent

against the appellant was the vote of the
ending juror, Joneso

The effect of the above facts is bolstered by
idavits of jurors Baessler and Tippets in that
V show beyond any doubt the manner

in which the

lr, Jones, participated in the formation and

ltion of the verdict,

together with the legal

lseology and conclusions which he used to
~ess

his views.

Respondent objected and moved to strike the
.davits, apparently upon the authority of Wheat
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examination of the

Vo

ntents of the.affidavits here discloses that they
~

no

~ffort

r to show

to impeach or question the verdict

the grounds upon which the verdict was

ndered, nor to show any misunderstanding of fact

lawo
The affidavits do not disclose the surmises
processes of reason of the juror nor do they
rpo:rt to do soo

As a result!)

it is respectfully

lmitted that the affidavits do not come within the

striction set forth in the Wheat, supra, case and
lt

the ruling of the trial court in excluding

!m was

erroneous

o

Under the California rule

is necessary to show the misconduct of the juror
1

harmful to the appellanto

It is submitted that

affidavits were offered only for the purpose
showing that the misconduct of the juror, Jones,
I

in fact vitally detrimental to appellant's cause.

is submitted that the affidavits do. in fact, when
.sidered in conjunction with the sworn testimony
ch is not controverted~
.age as a result of

show that irreparable

such misconduct was done to

appellant by the offending juror.
The affidavits do not purport to show misdu c t
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of

e j u r o r , J on e s wa s i n f a c t p r oven b y h i s b r o t h e r
d by his statement at

'i

the time the jury was polled.!:II

may be that the statements contained in the affi-

I

vits are cumulative, but that does not make the
idence contained therein incompetento

The verdict

d already been rendered invalid by the acts and
nversations of Jones outside of the court room
It must necessarily follow that the request of

pellant for a new trial on this ground should
ve been granted on

the basis of these undisputed,

contradicted facts.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the appellant
s deprived of all of the fundamental rights of a
ry

trial in the above entitled case, because he

; required to submit his claim for recovery to
jury that was not advised as

to any theory

>n which the appellant predicated his right or
Lim for recovery.

On the contrary,

the only

:ormation that the jury had relating to the
:stion as to whether or not the appellant had

ight to recover damages for his injuries was an
dequate, improper and incomplete instruction
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~~

sed solely upon the respondent's theory, if anyo
is respectfully submitted that the appellant
entitled to a new trial upon the issues involved
this law suit and upon the court's failure to
struct, and for the additional reason that the
urt erred in refusing to grant a new trial by
ason of the misconduct of the juror, Joneso

Respectfully submitted,

C. C. Patterson of
Patterson & Kunz
Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Appellant
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